Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process-driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War

Ana Arjona

ABSTRACT

Why do armed groups fighting in civil wars establish different institutions in territories where they operate? This article tests the mechanisms of a theory that posits that different forms of wartime social order are the outcome of a process in which an aspiring ruler—an armed group—expands the scope of its rule as much as possible unless civilians push back. Instead of being always at the mercy of armed actors, civilians arguably have bargaining power if they can credibly threaten combatants with collective resistance. Such resistance, in turn, is a function of the quality of preexisting local institutions. Using a process-driven natural experiment in three villages in Central Colombia, this article traces the effects of institutional quality on wartime social order.

> *The FARC were everything in this village. They had the last word on every single dispute among neighbors. They decided what could be sold at the stores, the time when we should all go home, and who should leave the area never to come back.… They also managed divorces, inheritances, and conflicts over land borders. They were the ones who ruled here, not the state.*
> — Local leader, village of Librea, municipality of Viotá

> *We [the peasant leaders] are the authority here. People recognize us as such. [The FARC] could not take that away from us. They didn't rule us.*
> — Local leader, village of Zama, municipality of Viotá[1]

These are the testimonies of residents of two villages, about a mile apart, in the Colombian Andes. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) controlled the area for about 12 years, but did so in drastically different ways in both places. In Librea, the rebels ruled over the political, economic, and social lives of the population, while in Zama, civilian leaders remained the ultimate authority. Here, the FARC controlled the territory militarily, but civilians were in charge of arbitrat-

Ana Arjona is an assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University. ana.arjona@northwestern.edu

ing disputes, deciding the rules that guided social interaction, and holding meetings to discuss community problems and decide on important issues.

The divergence in FARC oversight between these villages epitomizes several puzzles of civil war. First, armed groups often create new forms of order in the territories where they operate; second, such order can rely on different institutions—understood as rules, norms, and practices that structure behavior (North 1990); and third, civilian-combatant relations can vary substantially, even across small communities within a district. What explains this variation?

The dominant image of life during wartime is that of an exceptional situation: violence, anarchy, and uncertainty are widespread. Life is suspended, as if the war were a tragic parenthesis in the evolution of the societies that endure it. Our study of conflict zones tends, therefore, to focus on violence. Yet life does go on during wartime. Violence has devastating effects, to be sure, but it does not eliminate politics, economic activities, and social relations—it transforms them (Arjona 2009, 2014; Justino 2013; Wood 2008). The types of institutions that regulate behavior in conflict zones give place to new forms of social order characterized by distinct patterns of being and relating.

To conceptualize these local realities that emerge in conflict zones, I have proposed elsewhere a typology of wartime social order that differentiates, first, between order and disorder. Order exists when there are clear rules of conduct that both civilians and combatants follow, giving place to predictability. When such rules are not clear or are often violated, disorder emerges. Second, the typology differentiates between two forms of social order based on the scope of the armed group's intervention in local affairs: rebelocracy, in which it rules to regulate civilian conduct beyond public order and taxation; and aliocracy, in which it intervenes only in public order and taxation, while other matters are in the hands of others, be it the state, tribal leaders, or some other actor (Arjona 2014).

Understanding variation in wartime order and institutions is essential to our study of civilian-combatant relations, rebel behavior, the conduct of war, and the legacies of conflict (Arjona 2009, 2014; Justino 2013). Why do armed actors that rule civilians in contexts of civil war do so in different ways? More specifically, in situations where order emerges, why does it take the form of rebelocracy as opposed to aliocracy?

The emerging literature on rebel governance has sought to explain why insurgents rule civilians (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Kasfir 2004; Weinstein 2007; Metelits 2010; Mampilly 2011), rather than why they rule them differently. Furthermore, the emphasis has been on the provision of security and public goods, while the creation of different institutions tends to be overlooked. A rich literature on insurgent groups in Latin America has documented the many ways that armed groups govern civilians (e.g., La Serna 2012; Manrique 1998; Wickham-Crowley 1987; Gutiérrez and Barón 2006; Aguilera 2013), but it does not seek to explain variation in the institutions that operate in war zones. Likewise, while the literatures on organized crime and urban governance have investigated statelike functions by violent nonstate organizations (Skaperdas 2001; Skarbek 2011; Wolff 2015; Arias

2009; Davis 2010), they seldom seek to explain variation in the type of institutions that are established.

Based on original data on wartime social order in a random sample of 70 localities controlled by either guerrillas or paramilitaries throughout Colombia, a recent study finds support for a theory that puts civilian agency at the center of these dynamics (Arjona 2016a). According to the theory, when armed groups control a territory and pursue long-term goals, they prefer to create rebelocracies. If they encounter a community that is likely to resist collectively, however, they are likely to limit their rule, establishing aliocracy instead. This concession is based on the groups' expectation that collective resistance will preclude civilian cooperation in the long run, thereby endangering territorial control. By establishing aliocracy, rebels give up some of the benefits of rebelocracy but preserve territorial control.

Collective resistance to rebelocracy is a quintessential collective action problem: it is risky and, if successful, both participants and nonparticipants would benefit. To explain which communities are likely to resist, the theory turns to the legitimacy and efficacy of their preexisting local institutions, especially their dispute institutions—those that adjudicate disputes, enforce contracts, and protect property rights (Abel 1974). Dispute institutions are legitimate when most locals recognize them as valid, and are effective when they are actually followed.

The quality of dispute institutions affects collective resistance via two mechanisms. First, since they are essential for the maintenance of order and for allowing people to coordinate, dispute institutions influence civilians' preferences for their current governance structure. Civilians who count on high-quality dispute institutions are prone to dislike the imposition of rebel (or paramilitary) institutions under rebelocracy. Second, high-quality dispute institutions influence the extent to which community members rely on shared norms of behavior and conflict resolution schemes, as well as their capacity to coordinate and their interpersonal trust, reciprocity, and social cohesion. Since these factors have been found repeatedly to affect communities' capacity to initiate and sustain collective action, these communities are not only more willing to resist but also more capable of doing so.

Figure 1 shows the association between rebelocracy and institutional quality. It shows the average level of rebelocracy in all localities during the years their territories were controlled by guerrillas or paramilitaries. Rebelocracy is measured on the basis of an index that counts the number of behaviors that the armed actor regulated in the locality in the political, economic, and social realms. The quality of dispute institutions is coded as high if every one of a set of dichotomous measures of their legitimacy and efficacy equals 1. Rebelocracy is much higher in communities that had low-quality dispute institutions before armed groups arrived than in communities where those institutions were both legitimate and effective. Statistical models that rely on an instrumental variable to address potential endogeneity provide additional support for a causal relationship (Arjona 2016a).[2]

Although this quantitative evidence suggests an association between high-quality dispute institutions and lower levels of rebelocracy, it does not test the underlying mechanisms. Do high-quality institutions shape civilians' preferences to resist,

Figure 1. Institutional Quality and Rebelocracy

Source: Arjona (2016a)

as well as their capacity to engage in collective action? Does such capacity to resist give them bargaining power, pushing armed groups to adapt their ruling strategy?

Combining the logic of natural experiments and process tracing, this article isolates the causal mechanisms linking preexisting institutions and wartime social order. Testing the mechanisms, as opposed to only investigating the relationship between cause and effect, is essential to assess the explanatory power of a theory. Furthermore, a focus on mechanisms is particularly needed in the study of civil war, where, as Lyall notes, "both crossnational and microlevel studies have increasingly adopted research designs built to measure the direction and magnitude of the relationship between independent variables and outcomes rather than the mechanisms that underpin this relationship" (2014, 188). Finding out whether civilian agency does affect the strategies of guerrillas and paramilitaries has important implications for our understanding of the local dynamics of war, civilian-combatant interactions, civilian agency, nonviolent resistance, and the legacies of guerrilla and paramilitary rule for communities, their institutions, and their social fabric.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study compares three rural villages (*veredas*) in Viotá, a municipality located in central Colombia. The three villages were very similar until the 1950s, when, due to a fortuitous event, their institutional paths changed. This divergence offers a unique opportunity to trace the effects of institutional quality on the form of social order that emerged three decades later when the FARC took over the municipality.

The research design entails two components. Within-case process tracing is used to show that several "observations about context, process, or mechanisms," also known as causal process observations (CPOs) (Brady and Collier 2010, 24), are consistent with the mechanisms by which, according to the theory, institutional quality affects wartime social order. Specifically, it shows that in each case, several facts, as well as the sequencing of events, are consistent with the proposed hypotheses about the effect of institutional quality on civilian resistance, armed group behavior, and, in turn, wartime social order.

Second, CPOs are compared across three cases that are very similar but differ in the independent variable, due to a fortuitous event. From the 1930s on, the peasants of Viotá developed legitimate and effective institutions that led to an unprecedented agrarian reform, as well as highly successful autonomous governance. These institutions were preserved until the 1960s, when they started to decay everywhere in the municipality. However, one village escaped this fate: Zama. The most important agrarian leader received a plot of land in this village in 1942, and as a consequence, over time, most leaders migrated there. Together they preserved in Zama the institutions that had governed peasants in the past, while elsewhere those institutions slowly disappeared. When the FARC arrived in Viotá in 1990, they encountered low-quality institutions everywhere in the municipality except Zama. This study compares Zama to two other villages and shows that the different quality of their institutions led to dissimilar collective responses to FARC presence, distinct ruling strategies by the FARC, and in turn, different forms of wartime social order.

This study therefore invokes the logic of natural experiments in terms of an as-if-random event affecting units independently of their attributes. However, causal inference is based not on comparing averages between treated and nontreated units in a large sample, but on processes across a small set of cases—an approach that I have called elsewhere "process-driven natural experiments" (Arjona 2016b). As Bennett and Checkel (2014, 29) argue, combining within-case process tracing with a case comparison strengthens inferential claims, especially when there are few differences between the cases. In addition, the more similar the cases are, the more it simplifies "the task of process tracing since some (ideally all but one, but hopefully many or even most) mechanisms are being held constant" (Lyall 2014, 192). In this study, a natural experiment provides a strong basis for such controlled comparison by reducing the number of mechanisms that may underlie the causal effect of the main explanatory variable.

Conducting this study in Viotá has several advantages. First, the shared history of the communities and the sudden variation in their institutions offers a unique opportunity to compare processes across them. Second, Viotá is a hard case for this theory, given the most plausible alternative explanations—to wit, political ideology, identity, and economic interests. If any of these factors could explain resistance to rebelocracy, Viotá is *the* place where we should not expect to see a community resisting the FARC, a communist insurgency claiming to defend the interests of poor peasants. For decades, this municipality was one of the strongholds of communism in the country, and even though the FARC and the Communist Party eventually

distanced themselves from each other, their ideological proximity remained. In addition, if successful land reform precludes the success of rebel movements as is often argued (Albertus and Kaplan 2013), rebelocracy should not emerge in Viotá at all, because it is one of the few cases where land reform did happen in Colombia.

The study starts by reconstructing the development of peasant institutions from the 1920s to the 1950s. It then turns to the event that altered the institutional paths across villages and discusses the evidence suggesting that it was indeed fortuitous. It proceeds to trace the effects of institutional quality on wartime social order in each village in the 1990s. A separate section specifies the ways the different pieces of evidence support the theory or fail to do so. It also assesses rival explanations.

The empirical evidence comes from primary and secondary sources, as well as original interviews. The account of each village is based on interviews with both leaders and residents and with persons who knew well all three villages but were not from any of them. Former FARC members who operated in Viotá also were interviewed. The text refers to the interviews and a focus group with leaders from different villages as I# and F#, respectively. The list can be found in the online appendix.

HIGH-QUALITY INSTITUTIONS IN VIOTÁ: 1920S–1950S

Viotá is a mountainous municipality in the Cundinamarca Department in the center of Colombia. It is 80 square miles in area and comprises about 40 rural villages and 4 small towns, with a population of about 13,000, based on the 2005 census.

By the early twentieth century, most land in Viotá belonged to about 20 families, who had haciendas devoted to coffee cultivation. Since the possibility for peasants to acquire land was minimal, locals and migrants worked in the haciendas under very poor conditions, with their rights being constantly violated. Although peasants had demanded better conditions since the 1910s, it was only in the 1930s that they joined forces to obtain land (Palacios 2002, 156, 328). The newly formed Communist Party (CP) became a central force in this process, supporting an agrarian movement that eventually created institutions that not only enabled peasants' mobilization for land but also transformed the very pillars of social order in rural Viotá.

The history of these institutions goes back to 1932, when Victor J. Merchán, a former unionist in Bogotá, arrived in Viotá. Under his leadership, working groups, agrarian unions, and peasant leagues were formed in the municipality (Merchán 1975, 105; F1). The party grew so quickly that it soon gave place to a massive agrarian movement. In line with the guidelines of the Communist International at the time (IC 2015), the movement was structured on the basis of three organizational principles: mandatory participation in collective work, which included small study groups, meetings to discuss pressing issues, and undertaking legal and illegal activities; leaders were to have the closest ties with the masses; and party decisions were to have broad popular support and be strictly observed. This organizational structure would allow the movement to develop institutions to address different needs and challenges in the years to come.

The first institutions were developed to structure the struggle for land. The unions and associations were in charge of formalizing peasants' demands to the haciendas, as well as coordinating their illicit activities, such as occupations of land without legal ownership (Merchán 1975; F1). The elites felt threatened, and repression soon whipped Viotá. Peasants were persecuted, incarcerated, and killed. But rather than backing away, they responded by intensifying their fight, reporting all forms of mistreatment to the courts and the police, demanding better conditions, and organizing protests and strikes. At the same time, they worked clandestinely to protect themselves, forming the Red Guard, a self-defense group armed to repel attacks (Merchán 1975; F1).

Mobilization paid off. Seeing the backlash of repression, the hacienda owners started to give in. In the 1930s, they agreed to improve working conditions for the peasants (Jiménez 1990; Palacios 2002), and some negotiated with tenants to parcel the haciendas and sell the plots to them. By 1960, all but two haciendas had been parceled (Palacios 2002) and divided into more than four thousand small farms (Merchán 1975). This outcome has no other parallel in Colombia: Viotá's agrarian reform was exceptional, and the peasant movement certainly played a central role in it (Palacios 2002).

Getting land was, however, not all that these peasants achieved. They were also able to defend their lives many times. In addition to creating the Red Guard in the 1930s, they formed self-defense forces during *La Violencia*, the brutal civil war fought between Liberals and Conservatives between 1948 and 1959. In response to the Conservatives' attack on Viotá, the population quickly organized: some joined armed patrols and others were in charge of supplying goods, drugs, and clothes (Merchán 1975). Peasants also responded, with a highly coordinated scheme, to the violent campaign launched by General Rojas Pinilla against communities that were seeking agrarian reform under CP leadership. Their outstanding organization made Viotá was one of the few municipalities in the country's interior that witnessed only a few killings throughout *La Violencia* (Chacon 2004). What is more, the army was never able to take over Viotá.

And yet, defending themselves from violence was only one of the challenges that peasants confronted in that period. Since their local system of self-defense required them to remain in the hills, isolated from the urban centers, some system of governance was needed to avoid social conflict and hunger. Once again, the peasantry of Viotá excelled. They set up institutions to organize production on the farms and haciendas and to preserve public order. They created "control and solidarity commissions" and "popular tribunals" that were in charge of settling disputes among peasants. The community also solved problems related to education and roads (I4). Interviewees remembered this stage in their history as a unique example of popular rule, as well as a testament to their unity and organization (Merchán 1975; I4; F1).

Once the dictatorship was brought to an end in 1957, Viotá's peasants were able to return to the urban center and gradually escape their state of isolation. The permanent vigilance posts were dismantled, but the self-defense groups continued

their work to ensure the security of peasants, and the popular tribunals continued to be the preferred system for adjudicating disputes years after the war had ended. In 1962, the particular collective unity and autarchic character of Viotá was evident to outsiders: "It is different from the rest of the Colombian countryside. It has its own history, its epic songs, its heroes, its pioneers in the struggle for land, its own general concerns, its own means of communication, its rituals, its messianism, which practically constitute an entire culture" (Gutiérrez 1962, 85).

DIVERGENCE IN LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

As the haciendas were being parceled, small villages were formed. By 1960, no haciendas were left in Viotá, only villages and the main urban center (*cabecera*), where the municipal government is located. In each village, the peasantry had full legal ownership of land, a strong grassroots organization, and autonomous institutions that effectively maintained public order and adjudicated disputes. Yet in the years to come, several factors led to the weakening of the movement and the decay of those institutions.

To start with, land ownership made most peasants apathetic, as they felt that they did not have to fight anymore. According to Hilario (I4), one of the most recognized leaders, "The peasant is revolutionary only when he lacks land—as Lenin rightly said." Improved economic conditions also fueled a sense of complacency. Between 1967 and 1980, the coffee sector experienced sustained growth in Colombia, which led Viotá to enjoy prosperity. "We all had everything," said Felipe (F1). "The state and the Coffee Growers Federation started to give money for roads, schools, everything … so people felt they did not have to battle anymore."

In addition, as the state increased its presence in Viotá, the rural areas became more integrated. Once the state created formal institutions to regulate public order and adjudicate disputes, many peasants saw their autonomous institutions as superfluous. In addition, in 1958, the national government created a new form of local organization, the Communal Action Association (*Junta de Acción Comunal*, JAC), to serve as the formal interlocutor between citizens and the state. Since the JACs were the formal means to access a more powerful—and wealthier—municipal government, they soon became the dominant form of local-level participation, taking power away from the agrarian unions.

The Communist cadres were still convinced of the importance of preserving a grassroots organization and popular rule. To them, the institutions that had allowed their communities to be in charge of their security and dispute adjudication were still crucial to their safety and their development. This was the vision of peasant mobilization they had learned as members of the CP, and their experience had proved that vision right—this is how they got their land and how they escaped violence.

But this time, their work proved difficult. There were no pressing problems to address—no abusive planters, no armies, no extreme poverty; to most peasants, attending community meetings was not as important. In addition, the Communists were not the only ones trying to spur participation. According to a Liberal politician

(I36), "Now the discourse was not for land but for other goals—goals that were also stressed by the traditional parties; so the CP competed directly with them." What is more, since many peasants now owned land and hired workers, the communist ideology no longer fit their profile. To make things worse, the CP had neglected training the new cadres, and young leaders did not stand by the principles of popular participation and self-governance as did the old ones (I36).

Over the years, the JACs in the different villages preserved their function as intermediaries between the peasants and the state and played a key role in obtaining resources to build schools and roads. Yet they stopped adjudicating disputes and intervening to preserve public order, leaving these roles to the state. The JACs also lost legitimacy. As in other Colombian municipalities, they often became used for clientelistic purposes, in which the traditional parties would seek votes in exchange for favors and resources (Borrero 1989). By the 1970s, the decline in the quality of governance was evident: "[in Viotá] the sign of stagnation permeated all social and political activity. The strength that the peasant movement had had in previous periods faded away" (Ruiz 1983, 59).

By the 1980s, public order and dispute resolution were in the hands of the state. But the police and the other agencies in charge of adjudicating disputes were never as effective as the popular tribunals and unions had been. Furthermore, security was getting worse, and the police were not as able to preserve public order. The region was experiencing high levels of "common and quotidian violence that the newspapers registered daily," often called "the rural insecurity" (Ruiz 1983, 57). Interviewees from all villages reported this downturn in local institutions and peasant participation.

The village of Zama, however, escaped this fate: its institutions were preserved by making the JAC take over the roles of the old popular tribunals. Led by Communist leaders, the JAC remained for years the platform to hold meetings; to keep locals informed about current events; to make demands to the municipal government and the Coffee Growers Federation; to adjudicate disputes among neighbors; and to solve problems of public order (F1; I6; I22). To be sure, the villagers did not participate in meetings as much as they used to, but they still regarded the JAC as a legitimate institution and turned to it to solve many issues.

Why did Zama preserve its institutions while the other villages did not? "It goes back to 1946," said Felipe (I6), a cadre from Zama, "when the community had a collection to buy a plot and give it to Victor J. [Merchán] in gratitude for his community work." The most important leaders were, at that point, dispersed throughout the villages because as land was being parceled, they obtained their plots in various parts of the municipality, just as everyone else did. But with Merchán there, in the following years, Zama became a focal point: the "Communist House" was built there; it served as the CP headquarters in the 1950s; and in 1966 it hosted the party's 10th Congress (I11; F1). As time went by, several leaders sold their plots in the other villages and bought one in Zama: the first moved in 1950 (F1), and many others followed. By 1960, the CP leadership was concentrated in Zama. "That's life, [the leaders] just ended up together … to see each other more, to meet more often," said Felipe (I30). This allowed the village to preserve many of the governance struc-

tures that had flourished in the previous decades. In the rest of the municipality, however, those structures decayed and eventually disappeared.

COMPARING PROCESSES
ACROSS VILLAGES

This divergence in local institutions provides a unique opportunity to trace the effect of institutional quality on the form of order that emerged in the 1990s, when the FARC took over Viotá.

     This study compares Zama to two other villages, Tellus and Librea. It argues that the three villages were very similar up to the 1960s and that subsequent differences in their local institutions were merely coincidental. This is explained by three factors. First, the three villages have always belonged to the same administrative unit, and they shared the same history of mobilization, self-defense, and self-governance from the 1900s to the 1950s. Zama and Tellus belonged to the hacienda Florencia, and Librea to Los Olivos. Both haciendas were created in the late nineteenth century and went through different partitions (Palacios 2002). Zama came from one of the haciendas where the conflict for land had been most intense, but so did Tellus. Furthermore, the strongest agrarian union was located not in Zama but in Librea, and many of the most famous leaders did not live in Zama before the 1950s. Second, every time I asked why Merchán was given land in Zama and not elsewhere, the response was the same: there was no specific reason—the plot they found just happened to be in Zama, but it could have been in any of the other 40 villages. In addition, in interviews with the leaders who now live in Zama, it was very clear that the only reason they moved to Zama was to be near their comrades. Zama was neither more fertile nor wealthier than other villages in Viotá.

     Third, the evidence suggests that the incidental concentration of leaders in Zama had a direct effect on local institutions. The cadres of Tellus and Librea tried hard, but they did not have a critical mass to resist the expansion of the state and the apathy of the peasants. They joined the JACs and often served as presidents, but as time went by, fewer and fewer people participated. Elsa (I33), a leader who lived in Tellus back then, lamented that "most of [the Communist leaders] left" and "it led to a big vacuum. The communitarian process decayed." The quest of the cadres was even more difficult in Librea because the Liberal Party gained power and the community became divided along partisan lines. In Zama, on the contrary, being together made it easier for the leaders to preserve the peasant institutions of the past. To be sure, the movement of leaders did also entail a change in ideology and leadership across the villages. Nevertheless, both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence suggest that neither of these factors could alone explain the events that took place when the FARC ruled Viotá.

The FARC in Tellus and Librea

The origins of the FARC go back to self-defense groups that formed during *La Violencia*. In 1964, after the National Army attacked them, members of these groups launched a Marxist guerrilla organization known as the FARC. The group expanded throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Threatened regional and local elites formed paramilitary groups. In the 1990s, both warring sides saw an unprecedented territorial expansion, and the FARC became the strongest of all the guerrilla groups. It was in this context of war escalation that the FARC took over Viotá.

Even though FARC troops had been present in the mountains of Viotá since at least the 1970s, it was only in 1990 that they began to operate in the populated areas of the municipality. Their arrival in Tellus began with a dual strategy: a gradual penetration of the social fabric and a courting of the CP leaders. Combatants arrived slowly, making ties with a few peasants. They first approached a few individuals and stressed their ideology and their promise to work for the well-being of the community. Then "they used the entire discourse; with trust—you know, 'I know this *compadre* [buddy], and this other'—and they slowly created a social network that rapidly advanced" said Juan (I16), a Communist leader in Tellus.

Romantic relationships between rebels and civilians apparently helped facilitate the process. Also, some peasants received material support: "For those who didn't have money to buy groceries, there were the FARC: 'here you go, for the groceries'; and also to pay debts. They helped many people," added Juan. The FARC also promised to deal with thieves and quickly eliminated petty crime, a change many welcomed. They were even ready to chip in when parties or celebrations took place. "One day they paid for an orchestra to play for two days … they killed two cows to give meat to everyone at the party. Who wouldn't gain support in that way?" (I16). At the same time, the FARC promised the leaders that together they would make the JACs take over the municipal government and beyond. "Many fell for it," said Clara (I5), including some of the CP leaders.

The FARC's arrival in Librea was somewhat different. The community was divided along partisan lines: some supported the Communists and some the Liberals. The FARC exploited this division and sought the support of the Communists while declaring the Liberals their enemies. A few Liberals openly opposed the arrival of the FARC and were killed or expelled. The FARC then used the same mix of ideological appeals, offers of help, and social interaction to gain support that it had used in Tellus. Soon it managed to gain many sympathizers, including CP cadres.

The process by which rebelocracy was built was very similar in Tellus and Librea. The first step entailed moving from simply offering people help and guidance to demanding obedience to some rules. The rebels first regulated delinquency and behaviors that could compromise their own security. For example, moving around by car was forbidden after 6 P.M. They also prohibited "speaking out against the armed movement or complaining about it" (I23). Providing the police or the army shelter or food, or informing them about the FARC, resulted in a death sentence. Those who threatened public order were also punished: "thieves were usually

warned twice, and if they reoffended, were expelled or killed. Rapists and assassins were killed directly" (I23).

The creation of an alternate judicial system was central to the consolidation of rebelocracy. The best-known FARC commander in the area, alias Negro Antonio (Black Anthony), managed to establish his front (the 42nd Front) as the people's preferred court. When someone had a dispute over a land border or a debt or was victim of a robbery, they would say they needed to go to the 42nd Court. "They used to run everything—from marital separations to successions, inheritances, and bigamy disputes" (I16). Furthermore, "lawyers used to litigate both with normal law and with Negro Antonio. They would go up there [to the camp] to process papers. Even the notary went there. Entire processions climbed up the mountain to see him" (I37). To many residents, this was not only a convenient way to handle disputes but also one that met moral standards: as a Liberal leader (I35) said, the FARC "became a valid interlocutor." Most people in Tellus and Librea turned to the FARC to solve their disputes.

The FARC also influenced local organizations. "There were militiamen [part-time FARC members] working at the JACs," said a demobilized woman who had operated in the area. In some JACs, the FARC simply told the presidents what to do. A liberal councilman (I35) summarized the situation in one sentence: "there were no teachers, no parent associations, no JACs … only FARC." A local resident from Tellus (I32) stated that "five years after the FARC arrived, the CP [in Tellus] was nothing."

Many economic activities fell under FARC regulation. Selling certain brands of beer or soda was forbidden. If someone wanted to open a store, he or she had to seek permission from Negro Antonio. Wealthier peasants and merchants had to pay their dues on time to avoid harassment, kidnapping, or death. The FARC regulated salaries for wage earners on the farms and forbade cutting down trees for commerce and hunting endangered species.

Controlling domestic life was another part of the FARC's ruling agenda. Those who mistreated children or women were sanctioned. According to a former FARC combatant (I27), "[the abusers] would work to improve the condition of the roads for a day or carry the 'remittances' of the town up to the FARC's camp."

The group ultimately captured local democracy and took over the municipal government. Popular election of mayors was established in Colombia in 1988. The FARC saw in this change an opportunity to seize the resources of the municipal government for its own coffers, as well as to direct subsidies, services, and contracts to reward supporters or persuade potential ones. Viotá was no exception. The FARC's capture of the local government was comprehensive, as it vetoed candidates, co-opted politicians, and mobilized voters. Furthermore, it found the way to control many public servants: "All the state institutions in Viotá collaborated with the FARC," said a former combatant (I27). "The commander had them all organized. The mayor spent a lot of time with Negro Antonio, and the notary did, too."

Coercion was certainly used as a complementary strategy to ensure full power over the local administration. "Since 1994, mayors had to learn to deal with the

FARC and rule with it—enduring bombs, deaths, and threats" (I23). As a Communist leader from Tellus (I16) described it, "either by hook or crook, at City Hall everything was done as [the FARC] wanted. All the agencies functioned in the way they wanted, and with whom they wanted."

The FARC also provided private and collective incentives. "They used to steal from trucks and give the food away, or sell it very cheap to people" (I18). The group also maintained roads, forcing people to clean them once per month. Occasionally, it organized parties.

Ideological appeals were equally important. In Tellus and Librea, ideology was stressed repeatedly at meetings, as well as in private conversations. Some people reported meetings taking place as often as every two weeks, with mandatory attendance.

Last but not least, rebels achieved social control with strict monitoring and punishment. They relied on informants and allies in each village, who would communicate instances of disobedience and opposition. Some infractions were mildly punished, while others were dealt with by expulsion or death.

Civilian cooperation with the FARC was common, and entailed a broad range of conduct. Most people obeyed the myriad rules the group established. Many interviewees also described how individuals would denounce each other to the group as collaborators with the enemy (I23). Although many sought ways to please combatants in order to be on good terms with them, youngsters were particularly fond of the FARC. According to a leader (I6), "those who were not agile in taking their sons out [of Viotá] when they finished school eventually saw them joining [the rebels]."

To explain cooperation, there were stories of commitment to a just cause, the desire for status, reciprocity, material interest, strategic calculations, fear, and ambition. In every village, there was an amalgam of motives. Slightly surprised by my question on why people cooperated with the FARC, a leader (I42) responded, "Well, everyone supported them—you know, they were the government."

The FARC in Zama

In the village of Zama, however, things were different. Despite the FARC's decisive influence over virtually all spheres of life elsewhere in the municipality, this community managed to retain its autonomy on several fronts.

On arriving in Zama, instead of trying to penetrate networks and gain sympathies from below, the FARC held a meeting with the leaders. Combatants explained why they were there and offered their help to protect the community and improve people's living conditions (I4). Some leaders were supportive, some were not, but when the FARC tried to gain influence by offering to participate in the meetings of the JAC, all the leaders refused. At the same time, combatants approached the common residents of Zama here and there. But according to Felipe, "it was very difficult for the FARC to win over the masses. They did so in other places but not in Zama. People didn't follow" (I29).

As time went by, a tacit arrangement was consolidated in Zama. The rules that the FARC had imposed on security, mobility, and collaboration with the state armed

forces elsewhere in Viotá were also strictly observed in the village, but many aspects of daily life were still regulated by the old peasant institutions. The JAC meetings continued to take place without the presence of FARC members; decisions were made without consulting the commander; and problems were adjudicated as before.

The CP leaders kept doing their work at the Municipal Council sessions, where they held about 50 percent of the seats. They said what they thought and opposed FARC decisions that they viewed as harmful to the community. According to a Liberal councilman from a different village, the Communist leaders did not intercede for the FARC (I3). To a FARC ex-combatant, "[The CP leaders] did not want to be with the FARC or against them; they were part of the community. And when they did not agree with something that the FARC was doing, they went to see the commander and blocked things" (I27).

This is not to say that Zama's autonomy was always tolerated without any pushback. In fact, there were several instances in which the FARC probed the community and its leaders. Felipe recounted that "[Rebels] came and told us to our face that the CP was a hindrance for them, that our authority was a hindrance" (I6). Hilario remembered a time when there were rumors about the FARC wanting to kill him. "The CP leadership in Bogotá asked me to leave Viotá. But I was not going to! Instead, I went to see Negro Antonio" (I4).

There were also instances in which civilians were forced to obey rules beyond security. For example, locals had to attend certain meetings with the FARC (I22). Furthermore, the FARC did kill a few people from Zama; locals did not organize parties anymore; and some youngsters supported the group (F1). Despite these events, the bargaining power of the people of Zama proved high: the FARC's influence on the daily life of the peasantry in Zama was visibly less than what it was in Tellus and Librea, and the leaders were not killed, despite their efforts to defend their community's autonomy.

Civilian Resistance in Zama

In the late 1990s, the FARC's behavior started to change throughout the municipality. First the group started to recruit young men as militia, with no experience or training. "They spent their days riding motorcycles around town. People knew who they were. They were pretending to be *guapos* [brave and cool]. They delivered messages from the guerrilla" (I17). These new members started to abuse the population and to demand money without orders from the commander. Robberies also became common, and people knew the militia were behind them.

The FARC had used violence before, to be sure. But combatants were disciplined, and for the most part, people knew what to expect from them. Now it was different. The climate of uncertainty and fear took its toll on economic and social life, and there was a clear shift in people's attitude toward the FARC: "Before violence started, people were fine with the rebels; they were thankful for them." When the abuses started, people resented their presence and felt trapped, as it was too late to deny cooperation (F1). An ex-FARC fighter who operated in the area agreed:

"Everything was ruined because we did not take care of the social base. The commander gave too much power to the squad commander (*comandante de escuadra*), and they did not take care of people" (I27).

The FARC was also dealing with the threat of military confrontation. The paramilitaries were disputing FARC control in nearby municipalities, leaving in their wake many deaths. Everyone knew Viotá's turn would come soon. In 2000, the mayor, who was allegedly a FARC puppet, was killed, presumably by paramilitaries, followed by one of the mayoral candidates (*El Tiempo* 2000). The FARC started to screen the population, searching for defectors. Civilians felt the rebels tightening control over them and had no one to turn to. In the streets, people denounced a close collaboration between paramilitaries and state forces in the region (*Semana* 2003). The institutions that the FARC had created were crumbling, insecurity was widespread, and Viotá could not expect the police or the army to protect its citizens.

The people of Zama decided that they had had enough. This was not a form of governance that they could tolerate in their municipality. Trusting their capacity to organize and stand together, they decided to respond with collective action—once again.

The mayoral elections of 2000 were coming up, and the FARC, as usual, had its own candidate. Seeing that in other villages people's preferences were not with the FARC anymore, the Communist cadres decided to put forth their own candidate—a move that involved a direct confrontation with the FARC. Despite the risks, they trusted that with the support of the people of Zama, they could turn things around and become, once again, a viable alternative for the peasantry of Viotá.

Ricardo, one of the most famous and beloved leaders from Zama, was chosen as the candidate. He brought together both communists and non-communists. "It was a civic movement," said Dario (I15), from another village. However, Ricardo died of a heart attack one month before the elections. The FARC asked the Communists to support its candidate, but the Communist leaders decided to hold a primary election to select a candidate of their own. "Everyone who came to hold a wake for Ricardo cast a vote … communists and noncommunists voted," said Clara (I5). Adelia Benavidez, a young, smart cadre, won the election.

Two weeks before the election, Negro Antonio called 15 Communist leaders to a meeting. With a list in his hands, he accused them of many things, from informing the army to corruption and gossiping. "He tried to scare the leaders, but they didn't let him" (I5). Negro Antonio made it clear that the FARC had already decided who the mayor should be, and carrying out the leaders' campaign would be a frontal act of aggression to the organization. "The candidacy of Adelia was an act of bravery, an open opposition. We were convinced that we were right, and that gave us courage. We wanted to show our point of view. To show the town and the army the position of the CP leaders, and the FARC that they were wrong" (I5). The leaders went back to their homes and continued the campaign. On the day of the election, "The FARC was very mad. Combatants were furious," Clara (I5) recalled. "They threatened us and ordered everyone to vote for their candidate. While people said they would, most ended up voting for Adelia, and we won."

While this success showed that many in Viotá did not want the FARC to rule anymore, not everyone was convinced yet, and, according to Laura (I40), one of Adelia's closest aides, six of the council members were FARC allies. In addition, even though the FARC abuse did decrease civilian cooperation with the rebels, it did not suddenly create the conditions for collective action everywhere in the municipality. Voters defied the FARC when casting their vote, but this was not a very risky enterprise because the FARC did not monitor who voted for Adelia. The real risk was faced by those who campaigned for her.

According to Laura, everyone supported Adelia: "the conservatives, the liberals, the communists, the noncommunists, those who pray and those who do not" (I40). But people were really afraid to express their support in public. "It wasn't a big campaign because it was a short period of time, and we couldn't kick up a racket [*hacer bulla*], it was all under the table." Leaders from most villages and from all the political parties did support Adelia, but "it was support, not active work … [they] were all in a waiting mode … everyone had to protect themselves." It was the people of Zama who carried out the most dangerous work for Adelia's candidacy. For example, they attended small, clandestine meetings, which was risky; sometimes even the persons who agreed to hold the meetings at their homes would not attend. Although many supported Adelia, those who came together to engage in dangerous collective action to sustain her candidacy were, for the most part, the people of Zama.

After the election, the FARC organized a rally against Adelia and forced everyone to attend; it also threatened her and asked her to leave the municipality. But Adelia did not give in. She stayed and fulfilled her service and asked the central government for protection. When asked about who helped Adelia during these difficult times, Laura said that the leaders of Zama were in constant communication with her, and worked with her. As it turned out, the FARC did not retaliate against any of them. Some residents said that Negro Antonio was transferred to another area, due to his failure to control the elections, and was replaced by a commander known as Shirley. In any case, the FARC's military control did not last long, as the paramilitaries—in collusion with the army (*El Tiempo* 2008; *Semana* 2015)—soon took over the municipality. By 2004, the FARC was gone.

CAUSAL INFERENCE

The previous sections provided detailed evidence on the evolution of local institutions in the three villages and the events that took place when the FARC arrived in Viotá. This section discusses how these different pieces of evidence support the theory introduced at the beginning of the article. According to the argument, the quality of local institutions is an important determinant of civilians' preferences and ability to resist rebel rule; when civilians can resist, they have bargaining power with armed actors, as the latter have incentives to adapt their ruling strategies in order to avoid collective resistance. This section explains how these hypotheses are consistent with the evidence presented so far. It also discusses potential threats to causal inference. Since the discussion has already addressed how the evidence supports the claim

that the three villages had been quite similar and that the event that changed local institutions was exogenous, it focuses here on the factors that are not held constant by design.

> *Hypothesis 1: Civilian resistance to rebelocracy emerges where the quality of preexisting local institutions is high.*

Two mechanisms underlie this hypothesis. First, the quality of institutions explains civilians' desire to resist. This is supported by the evidence that in Tellus and Librea, most locals welcomed not only the FARC's presence but also the institutions the group offered. In particular, people not only obeyed rules but also turned to the FARC to adjudicate disputes and solve problems. To be sure, a few leaders did resent the expansion of FARC rule, but they were a minority. In Zama, by contrast, while some people welcomed the presence of the FARC for ideological reasons, most kept turning to the old governing institutions to solve their problems, while rejecting FARC institutions.

The second mechanism is the effect of the quality of institutions on civilians' capacity to resist. When FARC members started breaking the rules and abusing locals, many wanted to oppose them. But it was Zama that launched resistance and bore the highest costs: Adelia was from Zama and, for the most part, it was the people from Zama who campaigned for her.

> *Hypothesis 2: When confronting communities that can resist, rebels adapt their strategies insofar as civilians' demands do not compromise territorial control.*

The underlying mechanism is that the potential for civilian resistance gives civilians bargaining power: if they want rebel rule to change and can resist, rebels make concessions. Several elements show that Zama had a bargaining power that Tellus and Librea lacked. In Zama, people denied intervention in subtle ways—for example, declining offers to hold their JAC meetings with FARC members—while the leaders spoke up at the Municipal Council meetings and talked to the FARC commander when they disagreed with the group's decisions. The rebels, for their part, tolerated demands and did not impose rebelocracy on Zama. They did try to expand their influence and, on a few occasions, harassed the leaders. But as the community did not give in, the FARC backed off.

Another event that supports this argument is that when Zama resisted, the group still did not hurt the leaders. The FARC did not know the paramilitaries and the army would soon force them out, so it was probably still concerned about its ability to control the territory in the long run. It is therefore highly plausible that the group did not hurt the leaders because it knew that doing so would backfire, given Zama's capacity for collective action.

Several events also show that in the villages where collective resistance was unlikely, Librea and Tellus, rebels did not tolerate opposition to their rule, and established rebelocracy: the few Liberals who opposed the FARC in Librea were

killed or expelled, and the Communist leaders who wanted to resist rebelocracy in Tellus did not think they could voice their opposition—and they did not. As a result, in both villages, a full-fledged rebelocracy operated for years.

Alternative Explanations

By comparing cases that, having been very similar, diverged due to a fortuitous event, the research design for this study limits the possibility of alternative explanations, but it cannot rule them out. It is possible that other events could have taken place between 1950 and 1990 that affected only Zama or only Tellus and Librea and in turn, shaped social order when the FARC ruled Viotá. Two such developments can be identified. First, members of the Liberal Party had large farms in Librea and gained power there, but not in Tellus and Zama. Yet this alone cannot explain why rebelocracy was established not only in Librea but also in Tellus. The evidence also shows that the Liberals' presence affected how the FARC approached the village at the beginning—by targeting the Liberals and exploiting internal divisions in the community. But once the Liberals were gone, the FARC built rebelocracy in very similar ways in both Tellus and Librea.

Second, it was very difficult to get land in Zama for people who did not have a good relationship with the cadres; thus Zama became quite homogeneous over time, which may have contributed to its capacity for collective action regardless of its institutions. Yet the same thing happened in Tellus. Furthermore, according to a person from the urban center, Tellus was actually more homogenous than Zama (I37). This factor cannot, therefore, explain why Tellus and Zama experienced different outcomes.

It is also possible that the gift to Merchán influenced other factors that, in turn, would shape locals' relations with the FARC. A first possibility is ideology: has communism something to do with the outcomes? The cases actually go against the most obvious hypothesis, which would claim that civilians resist rebel rule when they dislike rebels' political goals. Given that both the FARC and the CP are communist, Zama is the place where civilian resistance should not happen. This does not mean that ideology does not facilitate civilian-combatant relations; it certainly does. Yet civilians who support the ideas of a rebel group may want to help it but not to be ruled by it. We could focus instead on the ideological differences between the FARC and the CP—there were tensions between the two organizations nationwide since at least the 1980s (Medina Gallego 2009)—and argue that the leaders of Zama led resistance due to their ideological differences with the FARC. But then, why did Communist cadres in Tellus and Librea not oppose rebelocracy?

Ideology could also potentially explain the FARC's tolerance of Zama's autonomy: perhaps it was only because the leaders shared their ideology. Yet the evidence that the FARC at some point did probe the leaders and harass them, even before Adelia's campaign, suggests that the group was at least bothered by that autonomy. Furthermore, there were cadres in Tellus and Librea, too, and the FARC did not give them any autonomy.

Another plausible explanation points to leadership, as opposed to high-quality institutions. Some empirical evidence suggests that leadership cannot explain, by itself, the observed outcomes. Communist leaders were in both Tellus and Librea when the FARC arrived; their mere presence was, however, not sufficient to spur resistance. While it is possible that in Tellus and Librea people could not resist because leadership was not good enough, the evidence suggests that in those villages people were not willing to resist in the first place, as locals not only obeyed the FARC but also actively used its system of dispute adjudication. In addition, recruitment was higher in Tellus and Librea than in Zama, as was denunciation of neighbors to the FARC. That said, leadership may play an important role in these processes as a key igniter of collective action and as an important force to sustain it, especially in highly dangerous situations. It may be that leadership is a necessary condition for resistance, even though it is not a sufficient one. This study cannot rule out the role of leadership, and raises questions about the relationship between leadership and informal institutions.

It is worth pointing out that the research design rules out the theories of peasant resistance, on the one hand, and rebel governance, on the other, that point to social, political, and economic conditions, such as the previous role of the state (Mampilly 2011; Wickham-Crowley 1987), threats to peasant subsistence (Scott 1976), land reform (Albertus and Kaplan 2013), economic conditions (Paige 1975), and communal ties (Wolf 1969), because all villages shared the same social, economic, and political history. A theory of selective incentives also fails, because the people of Zama did not receive any selective incentives from the state or the CP to oppose the FARC.

Furthermore, variation in wartime social order cannot be explained by different levels of intensity of the armed conflict, or by variation in the FARC's interest in controlling the different villages. Indeed, in a recent study, locals from different villages of Viotá identify Zama, Tellus, and Librea as three of the seven villages that were most affected by the conflict (*Tejidos del Viento* 2014).

In summary, the history of these villages shows that the causal effect of institutional quality on the form of wartime social order that they experienced is highly plausible, and that alternative explanations do not seem to hold.

SCOPE CONDITIONS
AND GENERALIZABILITY

Under what conditions is collective resistance threatening to armed groups? The argument that this study aims to test applies to situations in which one armed group controls a territory and pursues long-term goals.[3] It does not expect civilians to have high bargaining power in situations in which armed groups compete for territorial control or lack the discipline to make their rank and file pursue the long-term goals of the organization. In addition, armed groups may not tolerate civilian autonomy when their use of the territory requires high levels of social control over the population, such as for safe havens. In these contexts, tolerating civilian auton-

omy is costly because the group needs unconditional civilian cooperation, and therefore communities with high-quality institutions have less bargaining power (Arjona 2016a).

How generalizable are these findings? Tracing processes in order to test mechanisms requires delving into a small number of cases. This is a study of three villages, and they are not necessarily representative of Colombia. However, there are reasons that make this generalization plausible. First, peaceful resistance to armed actors is not a rare event; it has been documented in many studies, not only in Colombia but also in other countries (e.g., Hancock and Mitchell 2007). Second, quantitative and qualitative evidence from several indigenous and peasant communities in Colombia suggests similar patterns to those observed in Viotá (Arjona 2016a).

Third, according to different studies, it was precisely the capacity for self-governance and collective action that came from autonomous dispute institutions that allowed communities in Peru to resist the penetration of the rebel group Shining Path. In the region of Cajamarca, for example, peasants had developed, since the 1970s, local committees called *rondas campesinas* to maintain order and adjudicate disputes. These committees gained massive recognition among peasants, were seen as legitimate, and were quite effective at controlling petty crime, transgressions of public order, and even corruption (Gittitz 2013; Picolli 2009; Lair et al. 2000). Some authors have argued that the *rondas,* by enabling collective action, impeded Shining Path's expansion in the region (Picolli 2009; Lair et al. 2000). Local institutions also seem to explain variations in Shining Path's success in other regions of Peru. In Ayacucho, Heilman (2010, 195) found that Shining Path militants "fared best in those areas rife with sharp internal conflict, abusive authorities, and *gamonalismo*." Similarly, La Serna (2012) argues that in Ayacucho, Shining Path met resistance in communities whose systems of justice were effective and found acceptance where such systems were not.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite a growing interest in opening the black box of conflict zones, we lack explanations for the variation that exists in wartime institutions and the form of social order that they bring about. Instead of focusing on the armed actors alone, this study privileges the role that civilians come to play in shaping the institutions under which they live. While one of the tenets of decades of research on guerrilla warfare and insurgency is the centrality of civilian support for rebel survival and success, the bargaining power that such a position proffers civilians has been widely ignored. This study recognizes this possibility and investigates the conditions in which civilians can work together to make demands of armed actors. In so doing, it brings politics to the center of civilian-combatant relations.

In addition to proposing a logic driven by civilian agency, this is also an institutionalist account. It argues that the real collective action problem in many conflict zones is not supporting an armed group but resisting it. Civilians cannot threaten armed actors with resistance unless they are both willing to do so and able to over-

come serious collective action problems; and preexisting dispute institutions, it is argued here, are key enablers of such enterprise.

Whether civilians have more or less autonomy has critical implications. First, war may hurt them less and have a lower impact on their social and political reality. In addition, the broader the scope of rule by an armed actor, the more that actor controls the population and its territory; the more it recruits; the more difficult it is for other warring sides to gain control over that territory. This has repercussions for many dynamics of war. The evidence also has implications for our theories of rebel behavior by showing the centrality of institutions in rebels' quest to control territories and populations. At the same time, this study offers a microlevel analysis of nonviolent resistance and specifies the conditions under which it may be effective not against repressive states (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) but against nonstate armed actors. Last but not least, this study offers a microscopic view of the creation of order, the ways that aspiring rulers come to power, and how political power is built within and outside the reach of state institutions and armed actors.

NOTES

1. Personal interviews, Viotá, Colombia. To protect the identities of participants, all the names of villages and interviewees have been changed.

2. See Arjona 2016a for details on how these data were collected. The coding of the variables and the map showing the sampled localities can be found in the online appendix.

3. By implication, it does not apply to a nascent rebel group that cannot control territory.

REFERENCES

Abel, Richard L. 1974. A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society. *Law & Society Review* 8, 2: 217–347.

Aguilera, Mario. 2013. *Guerrilla y población civil. Trayectoria de las FARC 1949–2013*. Bogotá: IEPRI/CNMH.

Albertus, Michael, and Oliver Kaplan. 2013. Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, 2: 198–231.

Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2009. *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Arjona, Ana. 2009. One National War, Multiple Local Orders: An Inquiry into the Unit of Analysis of War and Post-War Interventions. In *Law in Peace Negotiations*, ed. Morten Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz. Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher. 199–242.

———. 2014. Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, 8: 1360–89.

———. 2016a. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2016b. Process-Driven Natural Experiments. Working Paper. Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.

Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. 2014. Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices. In *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3–37.

Borrero, Camilo. 1989. Acción comunal y política estatal: ¿Un matrimonio indisoluble? Documentos Ocasionales CINEP no. 57.

Brady, Henry, and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Chacon, Mario. 2004. Dinámica y determinantes de la violencia durante "La Violencia" en Colombia. CEDE Working Paper Series 16.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Communist International (IC). 2015. Guidelines on the Organizational Structure of Communist Parties, on the Methods and Content of Their Work. Third Congress. https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/3rd-congress/organisation/guidelines.htm

Davis, Diane. 2010. Irregular Armed Forces, Shifting Patterns of Commitment, and Fragmented Sovereignty in the Developing World. *Theory and Society* 39, 3–4: 397–413.

Gittitz, John S. 2013. *Administrando justicia al margen del estado: las rondas campesinas de Cajamarca*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Gutiérrez, José. 1962. *La rebeldía colombiana: observaciones psicológicas sobre la actualidad política*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, and Mauricio Barón. 2006. Estado, control territorial paramilitar y orden político en Colombia. In *Nuestra guerra sin nombre. Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia*, ed. Gutiérrez Sanín. Bogotá: Norma. 267–312.

Hancock, Landon E., and Christopher Mitchell. 2007. *Zones of Peace*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Heilman, Jaymie. 2010. *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895–1980*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Jiménez, Michael. 1990. The Many Deaths of the Colombian Revolution: Region, Class, and Agrarian Rebellion in Central Colombia. Papers on Latin America no. 13. Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, Columbia University.

Justino, Patricia. 2013. Research and Policy Implications from a Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence and Development. In *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence and Development*, ed. Justino, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 290–306.

Kasfir, Nelson. 2004. The Creation of Civil Administration by Guerrillas: The National Resistance Army and the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government in Uganda. Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3.

La Serna, Miguel. 2012. *Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Lair, Eric, Julie Massal, and Marcelo Bonilla. 2000. Acción colectiva e identidad entre los campesinos en un contexto de violencia: las rondas campesinas del norte del Perú y el Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame en Colombia. In *Los movimientos sociales en las democracias andinas*, ed. Massal and Bonilla. Quito: FLACSO.

Lyall, Jason. 2014. Process Tracing, Causal Inference, and Civil War. In *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 186.

Mampilly, Zachariah. 2011. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Manrique, Nelson. 1998. The War for the Central Sierra. In *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*, ed. Steve J. Stern. Durham: Duke University Press. 193–223.

Medina Gallego, Carlos. 2009. *FARC-EP*. Tesis de Grado. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales.

Merchán, Víctor J. 1975. La Autodefensa. *Estudios Marxistas: Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales* no. 10.

Metelits, Claire. 2010. *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*. New York: New York University Press.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.

Paige, Jeffrey M. 1975. *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*. New York: Free Press.

Palacios, Marco. 2002. *Coffee in Colombia, 1850–1970: An Economic, Social and Political History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Picolli, Emmanuelle. 2009. El pluralismo jurídico y político en Perú: el caso de las Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca. Quito: FLACSO sede Ecuador.

Ruiz, Soledad. 1983. Café, tecnología y sociedad municipal. *Cuadernos de Agroindustria y Economía Rural* 11.

Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Semana (Bogotá). 2003. ¿Meras coincidencias? July 13.

———. 2015. La historia del coronel que se esfumó, January 31.

Skaperdas, Stergios. 2001. The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does Not. *Economics of Governance* 2, 3: 173–202.

Skarbek, David. 2011. Governance and Prison Gangs. *American Political Science Review* 105: 702–16.

Tejidos del Viento. 2014. Tejiendo Memoria. Municipio Viotá. Report. Fundación Tejidos del Viento. http://soda.ustadistancia.edu.co/enlinea/pazatiempo/eje2/mod3/unidad3/Tejidos_del_viento.pdf. (Accessed on May 10, 2015)

El Tiempo (Bogotá). 2000. El miedo ronda a Viotá. September 22.

———. 2008. Por alianza con "paras" en masacre de Viotá, destituyen al Capitán Édgar Arbeláez Sánchez. March 24.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1987. The Rise (and Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America. *Sociological Forum* 2, 3: 473–99.

Wolf, Eric R. 1969. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper and Row.

Wolff, Michael Jerome. 2015. Building Criminal Authority: A Comparative Analysis of Drug Gangs in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. *Latin American Politics and Society* 57, 2 (Summer): 21–40.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2008. The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, 1: 539–61.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting materials may be found with the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

    1. Appendix: Details on coding of variables and interviews